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INTRODUCTION
My son was unarmed. He was going to head off to college in two
weeks. I thought Tasers were non-lethal. This makes no sense. His
brother and sister are in shock.
– Travonna Howard1
It is not right for children to die before their parents. It is not right
for peaceful, unarmed citizens to die at the hands of the police. In my civil
rights practice, I have met many mothers, fathers, and family members
who are struggling to recover after a law enforcement officer caused the
death of their loved one. Sure, they want fair compensation. But money
does little to reduce their loss or make the grief more bearable. They often
want to do something that will ensure that their loved one did not die in
vain. They want to prevent other families from suffering the same loss.
This Article will show that even without standing to seek injunctive
relief, these plaintiffs can indeed secure significant reform. This Article will
also share suggestions for the practitioner on how to litigate these cases
economically and efficiently. Part I explores avenues for relief other than
compensatory and punitive damages. Part II shares language to include in
retainer agreements to encourage clients to share any settlement they reach
with the public to increase awareness of police misconduct. Part III ex-
plains that researching local police policies and practices helps to inform
where meaningful opportunities for reform exist. Part IV then provides
examples of resolutions that require the officers involved and their supervi-
sors to personally engage with the victims’ families or that commemorate
victims in their respective communities. Finally, Part V reviews techniques
for case selection, case theory, and working within a budget so the small
office practitioner can make enough money to carry the work forward.
I. PLAINTIFFS WANT AND DESERVE MORE THAN MONEY
Many believe that large verdicts or settlements act as deterrents and
help to prevent future abuses. However, because most municipalities and
counties are insured, the settlement payments are not made by the officers,
supervisors, or even departments responsible for misconduct. Many of-
1. Statement of Travonna Howard to the author after her 18-year-old son was tased on
the campus of the University of Cincinnati on August 6, 2011.
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ficers never learn that cases against them were settled and that money was
paid. Moreover, any settlement agreement typically contains a “no admis-
sion of liability” term. In cases that go to trial, we have to explain to the
family that they have no standing to seek injunctive relief.2 If the case is
tried, the only thing on the verdict form is a line for a monetary award. As
a result, if the jury awards compensatory damages, the wrongdoers may
never experience any personal consequences and the deterrence effect is
severely limited. A punitive damage award may have impact, but even that
is extremely rare.
Should we be satisfied by simply explaining to these families what we
cannot do with their lawsuit, or should we seek out the full relief the family
really wants? In my practice, I encourage clients to seek apologies and
targeted reforms as part of their settlement demands. This can be done
either before trial or, if the case is tried, it can be revisited after trial as a
way to resolve the case without a lengthy appeal.
II. START WITH THE RETAINER AGREEMENT
I begin discussing needed reforms with my clients before we enter
into the retainer agreement. My firm’s retainer agreement includes the
goal of our work: to seek “fair compensation and appropriate reforms.”
The first step in this regard is to discourage confidentiality clauses in order
to share the outcome of any settlement with the community.
Our standard retainer agreement achieves this by containing language
similar to the following:
No confidentiality clauses. Attorney and client agree that this civil
rights claim is brought in part to improve treatment of all per-
sons by government officials and others in positions of power.
The efforts of government officials and other defendants to
keep secret their wrongful conduct often impacts others by
covering up the conduct and remedy obtained. This eliminates
or reduces the deterrent effects of the lawsuit. For this reason
the Attorney recommends that client not enter into settlement
agreements containing a confidentiality clause.
This provision sets the expectation that confidentiality clauses will be op-
posed in all but limited circumstances to better serve the overarching pol-
icy concerns behind our cases.
Our cases and their resolution can only make a difference going for-
ward if the community is educated about the problem and how it was
resolved. This educational process often includes a press statement that the
plaintiff and the defendant issue together or a frank discussion with the
2. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (finding that federal courts
may not enter injunctive relief without a showing that alleged unconstitutional practices are
likely to be visited in future on plaintiff).
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defense attorney about how the settlement will be shared with the press
and the broader community. In some instances, the defendant is a unit of
government and is prohibited from entering into secret settlements. Some
plaintiffs will have personal reasons for keeping monetary awards private.
Even when a settlement amount must be kept private, we can make strides
toward reform by publicly discussing the noneconomic terms of the
agreement.
Many clients view a settlement as a loss—not vanquishing the defen-
dant in court is viewed as not securing justice. Those clients benefit from a
dialogue about goals for the case beyond retribution. Clients can develop a
broader notion of a fair settlement—one that helps them ensure the abuse
will not happen again. That includes structural and other reforms. Clients
need to be assured that if negotiations do not achieve a fair settlement,
then a trial will be demanded and the fight is on.
Once the client is informed about this broader rationale behind set-
tlements, the attorney and client can continue to think about the opportu-
nity to effectuate change through settlement while the case is being
litigated. We flag this in the introduction to our complaints by stating that
one purpose in bringing the lawsuit is to deter future civil rights
violations.3
III. REFORM TERMS
The most effective reform proposals are well researched and
grounded in best-established practices. For example, my firm has pro-
moted Taser reforms for many years. In 2012, we surveyed all forty-seven
law enforcement agencies in Hamilton County, Ohio, and issued a white
paper4 identifying deficiencies in local Taser policies. The paper included a
detailed list of recommendations specific to each agency.5 The Hamilton
County Chiefs Association responded, agreeing with many of the recom-
mendations and encouraging local agencies to adopt them.6 That ex-
change between my firm and the Chiefs Association accomplished more
Taser reform than several cases combined, but it was only possible because
my firm had a track record of pursuing Taser issues.
3. The reform language in the introduction is crafted to make it clear that we are not
seeking formal injunctive relief if there is no basis for such relief, as we do not want to trigger
unnecessary motion practice.
4. Alphonse A. Gerhardstein & Jennifer L. Branch, Taser Risks in Hamilton County Ohio,
GERHARDSTEIN & BRANCH (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.gbfirm.com/litigation/documents/54
_TaserRisksReport.pdf.
5. See id.
6. Alphonse A. Gerhardstein & Jennifer L. Branch, Chiefs of Police Respond to Taser Risk
Report: Recommend Policy Reforms, GERHARDSTEIN & BRANCH, http://www.gbfirm.com/656/.
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A. Investigating Local Police Policies and Practices
The Taser report and accompanying advocacy were grounded in
many of our previously litigated cases and included observations from our
expert witnesses over the years.7 Although we are not against all Taser use,
we saw repeated instances of Taser abuse through unnecessary chest shots,
extended trigger pulls, and other deployment errors. This motivated us to
investigate local Taser policies and offer our suggestions for reform.
Working on several Taser cases provided the opportunity to accom-
plish reform in Taser training and policy. One case involved Everette
Howard Jr., an 18-year-old Black summer enrichment program student at
the University of Cincinnati.8 On August 6, 2011, Everett was ordered to
“get on the ground.”9 The unarmed Black male did not move quickly
enough to satisfy the campus police officer, and Howard was then tased in
the chest.10 He died at the scene.11 While the case was pending, the Uni-
versity’s police suspended the use of Tasers on campus.12 The case was
settled, and Howard’s family received $2 million in compensation.13 In
addition to monetary relief, the University agreed to consult Everett’s fam-
ily and the public as a whole regarding suggestions for Taser policies and
training before reissuing Tasers to UC Police Department officers.14 The
University also consulted with the family about commemorating Everett’s
life, and together they agreed on a memorial bench and plaque that was
installed on campus.15 Finally, the University President provided a personal
apology to the family.16
The family of Corey McGinnis also sought compensation and Taser
reform after his death.17 After playing basketball with his two teen sons and
nephew, McGinnis was involved in an altercation with police that resulted
7. See Gerhardstein & Branch, supra note 4.
8. Camille Mann, Student Everette Howard tasered by campus police at University of Cincin-
nati, CBS NEWS (Aug. 8, 2011, 12:32 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/student-everette-
howard-fatally-tasered-by-campus-police-at-university-of-cincinnati/.
9. Complaint at ¶ 21, Howard v. Haas, No. 1:12-CV-00586 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2012).
10. Id. at ¶¶ 25-29.
11. Id. at ¶ 30.
12. Mann, supra note 8.
13. Alphonse A. Gerhardstein & Jennifer L. Branch, UC Taser Case Settled: $2 Million Plus
Taser Reforms, GERHARDSTEIN & BRANCH, http://www.gbfirm.com/uc-tase-case-settled-2mil-
lion-plus-taser-reforms-2/.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Alison Montoya, Family settles lawsuit with NCH police for man’s stun gun death: Settle-
ment gives family $650,000, WLWT CINCINNATI (June 26, 2014, 11:55 PM), http://www.wlwt
.com/news/family-settles-lawsuit-with-nch-police-over-mans-stun-gun-death/26675670.
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in a Taser deployment to his chest.18 His family received $650,000 in com-
pensation and the following reforms were implemented:
• amending the police Taser policy to reflect the manufacturer’s pre-
ferred target zone;
• grading officer examinations taken during Taser training;
• conducting competent use of force investigations following Taser
deployments;
• taking reasonable efforts to participate in a national registry regard-
ing Taser impact if one is established; and
• implementing the reforms through a neutral expert with input
from plaintiff’s counsel.19
Another case challenged a Taser chest deployment with an extended trig-
ger pull. David Nall was unarmed, in his apartment when tased, and suf-
fered loss of respiration and then heart function leading to brain damage.20
He will have severely limited cognition for the rest of his life.21 His case
settled for $2.25 million along with a review of the city Taser policy and
training.22 The agreement also provided that Nall’s tasing would be used as
a case study for officers during in-service training.23
Another important public reform resulted from a wrongful convic-
tion case.24 Michael Green was convicted of a rape he did not commit.25
He was exonerated by DNA evidence.26 His conviction was based in part
on misleading testimony the state’s expert gave.27 Green was convinced
that the abuse that led to his false conviction for rape also caused others to
be improperly convicted.28 As a condition of his settlement he insisted that
18. Julie O’Neill, North College Hill police officer, police department sued in Taser-related death,
WCPO CINCINNATI (July 10, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://www.wcpo.com/news/local-news/
north-college-hill-police-officer-sued-in-taser-related-death.
19. North College Hill Settles Taser Lawsuit with McGinnis Family, GERHARDSTEIN &
BRANCH (June 26, 2014), http://www.gbfirm.com/north-college-hill-settles-taser-lawsuit-
with-mcginnis-family/.
20. Tracey Read, Painesville police Taser lawsuit case to go to jury trial, THE NEWS-HERALD
(Jan. 21, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.news-herald.com/article/hr/20140121/NEWS/14012
9900.
21. Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2015).
22. Painesville Tasing Case Settles for $2.25 Million and Improved Policing, GERHARDSTEIN &
BRANCH (Oct. 20 2015), http://www.gbfirm.com/painesville-tasing-case-settles-for-2-25-mil-
lion-and-improved-policing/.
23. Id.
24. Michael Green, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-
imprisonment/michael-green (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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there be a forensic audit completed of all similar cases in Cleveland,
Ohio.29
B. Apologies, Monuments, and Terms that Result in Personal Engagement
1. Apologies
Some clients do not welcome apologies, but others view them as a
very important personal statement. A sincere apology acknowledges the
pain suffered by the plaintiff. A sincere apology treats the plaintiff with
dignity.30 In one case a city manager, David Krings, started a mediation
with my client by apologizing for the conduct of his SWAT team. They
had forcibly extracted the woman and her two daughters from their vehicle
and held them at gunpoint in a terrifying stop completely unsupported by
probable cause. He made it personal by stating that he would be horrified
to have his daughter treated in this manner. My client was moved by his
sincere words, and the case was much easier to resolve as a result. The
settlement not only included compensation but also a commitment to train
the SWAT team on probable cause and to ensure that they followed the
law in future stops.
2. Officer Training
Carrie Culberson was murdered by her boyfriend, Vincent Doan.31
He also hid Carrie’s body, which has not been recovered to this day.32 Her
family sued the local police chief for failing to protect her body when it
was secreted in a local pond.33 After a $3.75 million verdict, the case was
settled.34 One term of the settlement provided for the institution of a
countywide protocol for domestic violence prevention and response train-
ing.35 The defendants also agreed to ensure that regular in-service training
was provided to officers to keep the new system in place.36
29. Id.
30. See Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, Can Effective Apology Emerge Through Litigation?, 72
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 271, 276 (2009); Alphonse Gerhardstein & David Kr-
ings, Uncomfortably True, Police Misconduct Cases, Keys to Appropriate Methods of Resolution, PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT 10, 11 (2012).
31. Kimball Perry, Dog bites off nose of murderer Vince Doan, CINCINNATI.COM (Mar. 5,
2015, 2:20 PM), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2015/03/05/murderer-vince-doan-
wins-taxpayer-money-dog-nites-nose/24445467/.
32. Id.
33. Janise Morse, Carrie’s relatives win $3.75M award: Jury cites conduct of Blanchester’s police
chief, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Feb. 2, 2001), http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2001/
02/02/loc_carries_relatives.html.
34. Id.
35. Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release at 4-6, Culberson v. Doan, No.
C-1-97-965 (S.D. Ohio July 3, 2001), http://www.gbfirm.com/litigation/documents/Culber
son%20settlement%20agreement.pdf.
36. Id. at 6.
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Since government training is often a passive experience where of-
ficers simply watch a presentation, it is important to advocate for training
that is graded and that helps officers become proficient with the task at
issue, such as that achieved in the McGinnis Taser case described above.
3. Monuments and Plaques
The reform pursued should be tied to the case, and the client should
be allowed as much creativity as possible. The important work of protect-
ing the safety of vulnerable citizens should never become routine. Visual
memorials can help remind officers of their profound duties. For example,
after repeated abuse, Suzie Thompson finally called the Warren County,
Ohio Sheriff and had her boyfriend arrested.37 Even from jail he called and
threatened to kill her.38 Thompson reported these threats and filed charges
against her former boyfriend, seeking a temporary restraining order against
him.39 Unfortunately, the Sheriff included her former boyfriend in a holi-
day furlough program.40 Eligibility was based on his status as a compliant
jail inmate.41 He was released on furlough and immediately proceeded to
the Thompson home and murdered Suzie.42 The settlement between the
family and the Sheriff included a granite memorial quarried from the
hometown region of the family in Quebec, Canada.43 The memorial was
dedicated to all victims of domestic violence and was installed across from
the entrance to the Sheriff’s Department.44
In another case the Hamilton County, Ohio, coroner permitted a
commercial photographer to photograph bodies in the morgue after plac-
ing various props on the bodies.45 The settlement of the substantive due
process case by the families included payment of $8 million, destruction of
all images created by the photographer, an apology from the County, and
the installation of a plaque in a prominent place that reminds the morgue
staff to be vigilant in their duty to protect the bodies entrusted to their
37. Sheila McLaughlin, Victim’s family wants to know why justice system failed: Lebanon woman
killed by furloughed prisoner, The Cincinnati Enquirer (July 17, 2000), http://enquirer.com/edi-
tions/2000/07/17/loc_victims_family_wants.html.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Laura Pulfer, Suzie Thompson: Promise carved in stone, The Cincinnati Enquirer (Oct.
25, 2001), http://enquirer.com/editions/2001/10/25/loc_pulfer_suzie.html.
44. Id.
45. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Class Action Settlement of Injunction Claims
and Response to Objections at 5-6, Chesher v. Neyer, No. C-1-01-566 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 8,
2007), http://www.gbfirm.com/litigation/documents/23_473-Pltfmemoinsupportofsettlement
.pdf.
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care.46 Similar plaques have been installed in jails as part of settlements for
jail suicides or other jail death cases due to inadequate medical care.
4. Sharing Experiences
Another very effective technique can be including personal en-
counters in a settlement. I have my clients attend all depositions so they
meet everyone involved. Some settlements also include an opportunity for
the client and appropriate defendants to meet one-on-one or with their
attorneys to voice how they felt as a result of the treatment they or their
loved ones received and what they hope to see changed going forward. In
one racial profiling case, for example, this meeting made a big difference.
The victims shared their experience undergoing a discriminatory traffic
stop where the officer ordered the couple to leave their car and submit to
drug-sniffing dogs. The husband and wife were very emotional as they
recounted to the officers how it felt to be publicly humiliated, standing for
twenty-five minutes outside their car, clearly accused of drug dealing. The
officers were moved by the personal story of the victims and apologized
sincerely. These victims were also able to talk extensively with the police
chief who was implementing policy changes to prevent such stops in the
future.
More recently, the settlement reached between the University of
Cincinnati and the family of Samuel DuBose utilized many of the settle-
ment terms described in this section. DuBose was shot and killed during a
traffic stop by a University of Cincinnati police officer.47 The officer, Ray
Tensing, was indicted for murder and is currently awaiting trial.48 In addi-
tion to $4.85 million in financial compensation for DuBose’s death, the
settlement included several non-economic terms: a personal apology from
the university president, a memorial on campus commemorating Samuel
DuBose, and tuition and fee waiver for all twelve of DuBose’s children
who qualify for admission to the University.49 DuBose’s family was also
invited to attend and participate in the Community Advisory Committee
meetings to offer their input on necessary and comprehensive police re-
form so that such abuses can be prevented in the future and other families
will not have to experience the harm that they suffered.50
46. Id. at 1-2, 11-12.
47. Press Release: DuBose Family and the University of Cincinnati Reach Settlement Worth 5.3
Million and Participation in Police Reforms, GERHARDSTEIN & BRANCH (Jan. 18, 2016), http://
www.gbfirm.com/dubose-family-and-the-university-of-cincinnati-reach-settlement/.
48. Tensing Pleads Not Guilty In DuBose Murder; Hit With $1 Million Bond, WVXU (Jan. 8,
2016), http://wvxu.org/post/tensing-pleads-not-guilty-dubose-murder-hit-1-million-bond-0.
49. Dubose Family, supra note 47.
50. Id.
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IV. LITIGATING EFFICIENTLY AND ECONOMICALLY
A. Problems Litigation Can Solve
Since there is no significant political lobby to promote prisoner rights
or the rights of suspects, civil rights litigation is the only reliable vehicle for
preserving the rights of persons subjected to arrest without probable cause,
excessive force, denial of medical care while in custody, and other abuses
imposed by state actors. Nevertheless, it is important to investigate and
frame the case in a manner that will promote a positive outcome. Princi-
ples most recently promoted by Don Keenan and David Ball correctly
guide plaintiffs’ attorneys away from ineffective appeals for sympathy and
toward arguments that appeal to themes that better resonate with jurors.51
For example, the notion that correction officers and police must follow
rules when they hold others in custody has ready analogies to nursing
home attendants who care for the elderly and bus drivers and teachers who
care for children. Jurors want the elderly and children to be safe. Jurors will
get engaged when they see they are helping create a system where people
who exercise power are held accountable. This is particularly true when
the jurors learn that the police officer was not criminally charged or disci-
plined even though rules were broken. Those facts will help jurors per-
ceive how important and relevant the civil rights claims of the plaintiff are
to their own lives. Selecting cases and framing them in this fashion should
result in better outcomes for plaintiffs.
1. Pre-Filing Investigation
Not every problem can be solved through litigation. Pre-filing inves-
tigation will ensure that the problem is appropriate for court and that the
facts will likely lead to a verdict for the plaintiff. There are a variety of tools
that can be utilized to evaluate whether litigation is appropriate at this
stage:
Public records requests can be used to obtain body- and cruiser-cam
videos, incident reports, statements, narratives, investigations (including
from third-party agencies), Emergency Medical Services reports, 911 calls,
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) records, daily activity reports, citizen
complaint records, photos, personnel files, policies and procedures, and of-
ficer training records from police departments.
Records can also be requested from sheriff’s offices in custodial abuse
cases. These records include inmate medical records, booking/intake
sheets, housing assignments, disciplinary and training records of the staff
members involved in the incident, relevant policies and procedures, log
books, observation records, and a staff roster.
A private investigator can be retained in appropriate cases and her
interviews, photos, and diagrams can be utilized to frame the case.
51. See generally Don Keenan & David Ball, REPTILE, THE 2009 MANUAL OF THE PLAIN-
TIFF’S REVOLUTION.
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Experts in the fields of corrections, police practices, and medicine
can also be consulted early in the case to assess whether the challenged
conduct violated professional standards of care.
Litigation management software can be used to organize your case
materials. It is especially helpful to have all documents scanned, numbered,
and summarized, making for instant recall of all important facts.
2. Case Selection and Getting Started
Once the issue has been thoroughly investigated, it is time to make a
decision about taking the case. Consider the client’s goals. These probably
fall under two categories: fair compensation and preventing future abuse.
You should let clients know that a lawsuit is simply one way to solve their
problems, and it can end in either a settlement or a verdict. Prepare the
client for both. If the client has specific goals in mind, not just the abstract
notion of “winning,” then a settlement can be an opportunity to gain fair
compensation and achieve needed reforms through noneconomic terms.
Frame the complaint narrowly. Do not include a specific dollar
amount in the complaint, unless and to the extent that it is required for
jurisdictional purposes. Adding high dollar figures can make any resulting
verdict or settlement look like a loss. Additionally, do not feel the need to
make claims based on everything the client alleges. Rather, you should
frame the suit based on the strongest facts, provable injuries, and favorable
case law. Use the complaint to tell a compelling story, and include an
introduction that the press can use to share the story.52 Explain to your
client that although some matters might not be addressed in the com-
plaint—i.e., that the officer was rude—they can be incorporated into the
story you tell at trial. Finally, it is important to make sure that your client
reads the complaint before it is filed and agrees to its scope and accuracy.
When evaluating claims and potential liability, remember that tort
“reform” does not apply to § 1983 claims because of the Supremacy
Clause.53 This means that joint and several liability will apply,54 not com-
parative negligence.55
When you select defendants, make sure you are suing defendants that
are either insured or have resources to pay a judgment. If the individual
defendants were discharged and will not be indemnified or covered by the
entity, then take care to ensure that you will be able to collect any award
from them. Obtaining a judgment against a defendant who cannot pay will
not solve the client’s goal of receiving fair compensation. When selecting
52. See infra Appendix I: Sample Complaint Introduction.
53. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
54. Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F 2d 185, 188 (6th Cir. 1993).
55. Quezada v. Cnty. of Bernalillo, 944 F 2d 710 (10th Cir. 1991); McHugh v. Olympia
Entertainment, 37 Fed. App’x 730 (6th Cir. 2002).
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defendants, also remember to carefully review the prospects for entity lia-
bility as well as individual liability.
B. § 1983 and Wrongful Death Claims
Consider a lawsuit where the constitutional violation caused the
death of the plaintiff’s family member. Generally, a § 1983 claim is
brought as a survival action and a state law wrongful death claim supports
the claim for damages for the heirs based upon the death itself. The mea-
sure of the constitutional injury is the pain and suffering endured by the
decedent from the onset of the civil rights violation until the moment of
death. However, if state law deprives the plaintiff family members of a
meaningful remedy for the death itself, there are arguments permitting
§ 1983 to trump those restrictions and provide for a full remedy including
conscious pain and suffering, loss of life, and punitive damages.56 Treat-
ment of the civil rights claim when the conduct has resulted in death varies
greatly in different states, so this is important to understand before filing.
For example, counties in Ohio are immune from state law claims based on
injuries incurred in jails.57 But a sheriff is not immune if his or her conduct
or supervision was reckless and proximately caused the injury.58 Thus, to
ensure a proper defendant under the state law wrongful death claim, the
sheriff should be sued instead of the county.
1. Private Actors as Civil Rights Defendants
While public policies may not be well served by outsourcing govern-
ment services, private actors are actually easier to sue than government
officials. For instance, state and local governments have outsourced medical
care in many of their jails and prisons, and inadequate medical care is a
common reason why private defendants are sued.59
First, private defendants acting under color of state law are generally
not entitled to qualified immunity60 or to governmental immunity under
most state laws.61 Second, private defendants typically have insurance;
56. See generally Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985).
57. R.C. § 2744.02(A); R.C. § 2744(B)(4).
58. R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b).
59. See e.g. Stojcevski v. County of Macomb, 2015 WL 6885751 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (plaintiff
sued jail’s private medical provider and provider’s employees); Sullivan v. Correctional Medical Ser-
vices, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-186, 2008 WL 4899430 (W.D. Mich. 2008) (plaintiff sued private en-
tity that contracted with state to perform medical services at prison); Turner v. Frey, 166 F.3d
1215 (6th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff sued private health services provider at jail but settled claims);
Davis v. Roane County, Tennessee, No. 3:12-CV-634-TAV-CCS, 2016 WL 125497 (E.D. Tenn.
2016) (plaintiff sued private medical services provider); Gordon v. Mohr, No. 3:14 CV 2105, 2015
WL 4275547 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (plaintiff sued private corporation providing medical care to
prisoners).
60. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
61. Under Ohio law, political subdivisions are immune to tort liability under R.C.
§ 2744.02(A)(1), and employees of the political subdivision are immune unless they acted with
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therefore, awards can be collected from them. In turn, they are responsive
to strong claims.
The presence of a private actor requires that careful thought be given
to strategy. In one case, my firm sued the regional tactical team known as
Allied Special Operations Response Team (ASORT), whose members
were officers from several municipalities.62 The Court accepted our argu-
ment that ASORT was like a volunteer fire department, a private unincor-
porated association under Ohio law.63 As such, ASORT could be sued as a
state actor under § 1983 although it was not a governmental unit under
the state immunity statute.64 This made ASORT not only a good § 1983
target but also a proper defendant for our claim of wrongful death and
other state torts. This strategic move proved successful because a munici-
pality cannot be sued for an intentional tort under Ohio law.65
In another case, Lowe v. Cuyahoga County, we sued the County, sher-
iff, civil servants, and a private company and its contract doctors who pro-
vided medical care at the Cuyahoga County jail in Ohio.66 The terms of
the contract for services did not set a constitutional standard, but the
County’s failure to enforce those terms was helpful in telling the story of a
lack of accountability.
2. Avoiding Qualified Immunity Delays
In almost every case litigated against government officials under
§1983, dispositive motions and appeals based on qualified immunity arise.
The goal of this section is not to describe the various ways to respond to
the merits of a qualified immunity claim. Rather, the goal is to demon-
strate how plaintiffs can minimize the delay triggered by defense motions
asserting qualified immunity (QI). The discussion below describes the af-
firmative defense, covers strategies to avoid its assertion, and details motion
practice for QI appeals.
Qualified immunity is a judicially created defense unique to cases
brought under § 1983. The defense is available only to individuals, not to
malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner under R.C.
§ 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Because these statutes only apply to political subdivisions and their employ-
ees, the immunity does not extend to private defendants.
62. Report and Recommendation at 2 n.2, Rush v. City of Mansfield, No. 1:07CV1068
(N.D. Ohio May 20, 2009), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ohnd-1_07-CV-
01068/pdf/USCOURTS-ohnd-1_07-CV-01068-3.pdf (“ASORT stands for ‘Allied Special
Operations Response Team,’ a tactical team formed by the Richland County Chiefs of Police
Association.”).
63. Id. at 10-22.
64. Id. at 12, 22.
65. See Rush v. City of Mansfield, 771 F. Supp. 2d 827, 874-75 (N.D. Ohio 2011)
(analyzing R.C. § 2744.02).
66. Lowe v. Cuyahoga Cnty./Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, No. 1:08-CV-01339 (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 8, 2011).
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entities such as cities or counties.67 The Supreme Court has created a two-
tiered test to determine whether defendants are entitled to qualified im-
munity.68 First, do the facts alleged show the defendant’s conduct violated
a constitutional right?69 If that question is answered affirmatively, then we
move to the second inquiry, whether the right allegedly violated was
clearly established when the violation occurred.70 The order for answering
these questions was recently relaxed by the Court, but the essential ques-
tions related to qualified immunity remain unchanged.71 Again, does the
plaintiff claim facts that describe a violation of a constitutional right? Was
that right clearly established on the date of the defendant’s conduct?
Qualified Immunity can be invoked early, even in a motion to dis-
miss directed at the complaint.72 A defendant who is denied qualified im-
munity may file an interlocutory appeal.73 The plaintiff’s challenge, then,
is to structure the case to proceed through discovery and trial without the
interruption of an interlocutory appeal (and the related twelve-month de-
lay). Interlocutory appeals cause witnesses’ memories to fade or disappear
and delay resolution to a plaintiff who is stressed because of the violation
and the litigation.
The best way to defeat a QI appeal is moving to dismiss the appeal in
circuit court and framing the resolution of the case as dependent on con-
tested facts. Contested facts will defeat interlocutory appellate jurisdic-
tion.74 This may be impossible if the plaintiff has not been able to conduct
67. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (“Qualified or ‘good faith’ immunity is an
affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official.”). Municipal liability, on the
other hand, is governed by Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S.
658 (1978). Under Monell, municipal liability is limited not by the availability of immunities, but
by the requirement that a municipal policy or custom must be responsible for the constitutional
violation. Id. Merely employing a constitutional wrongdoer will not create liability, as there is
not respondeat superior liability in such instances. Id.
68. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
69. Id. at 201.
70. Id.
71. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
72. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immu-
nity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985).
73. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-27.
74. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995); Carter v. City of Wyoming, No. 07-
2296, 2008 WL 4425986, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2008); see also Younes v. Pellerito, 739 F.3d
885, 890 (6th Cir. 2014) (dismissing appeal because triable issue remained as to facts, including
whether arrestee was intoxicated and whether he lunged at officers); Carlson v. Fewins, No. 11-
1062, 2012 WL 738734, at *2 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding lack of jurisdiction over deputy’s appeal
from denial of qualified immunity, where appeal was based on disputed facts and simply asked
the court to believe his version of events); Bomar v. City of Pontiac, 643 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir.
2011) (finding lack of jurisdiction over appeal of denial of summary judgment on excessive force
claim on basis that factual issues existed as to whether arrestee was sufficiently restrained);
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discovery before the defense moves for dismissal based on QI. Early mo-
tions are permitted because QI is supposed to be immunity from suit, not
just immunity from liability.75 To prevent this problem from arising, plain-
tiff’s counsel should gather incident reports, personnel files, photographs,
videos, statistics, and any other relevant public records to develop the fac-
tual basis for the claim. In addition, in limited instances courts may allow
for limited discovery directed to the issue of qualified immunity, even at
that early stage.76
The plaintiff’s counsel must be aware that the very effort to dismiss a
QI appeal may cause the appeal to last longer than it would otherwise last.
At least in the Sixth Circuit, there will be no merits briefing until a motion
to dismiss the appeal is ruled on by a motions panel.77 This means plaintiffs
should not file motions to dismiss in questionable cases. Instead, only
where it is very clear that contested facts defeat QI should such a motion
be filed.
If the dismissal of a QI appeal is pursued, plaintiff’s counsel should
also consider filing a motion to preserve the trial date and urging the dis-
trict court to proceed with the scheduled trial or other proceeding if the
QI claim is frivolous.78 That will encourage a prompt trial on the merits
and, ideally, a prompt resolution to the case.
Thompson v. Grida, 656 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 2011) (dismissing appeal because officers as-
serted their version of the facts was true and arrestee contested those facts); Mosser v. Watson,
No. 11-3558 (6th Cir. June 20, 2011); Lindsly v. Worley, No. 10-3630, 2011 WL 1838584, at
*3 (6th Cir. May 13, 2011) (finding contested facts that prevented QI appeal despite video
evidence); Hanson v. City of Fairview Park, No. 08-4238, 2009 WL 3351751, at *5 (6th Cir.
Oct. 20, 2009) (“The fact-bound nature of an excessive force claim makes our inquiry even
more problematic.”); Fink v. City of Hamilton, No. 09-3662, 2009 WL 1444556, at *18 (6th
Cir. May 21, 2009); Kies v. City of Lima, 612 F.Supp.2d 888, 898 (6th Cir. 2009); Whittie v.
Doyle, Nos. 05-2067, 05-2276, 2007 WL 627863, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2007) (explaining that
determinations of evidentiary sufficiency are not immediately appealable merely because they
happen to arise in a QI case); Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 742 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he determination that there exists a triable issue of fact cannot be appealed on an interloc-
utory basis, even when that finding arises in the context of an assertion of qualified immunity.”);
Strutz v. Hall, No. 04-1451, 2005 WL 451786, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005) (“We conclude
that the resolution of this case hinges on a question of fact, not a question of law or a mixed
question of law and fact.”); Ellis v. Washington Cnty., 198 F.3d 225, 229 (6th Cir. 1999) (dis-
missing appeal because there was a factual dispute, established by hearsay, whether defendant’s
actions were deliberate indifference); Hoard v. Sizemore, 198 F.3d 205, 219 (6th Cir. 1999)
(finding lack of jurisdiction on qualified immunity appeal because the district court determined
that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to what motivated constructive discharge).
75. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
76. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (remanding qualified immunity issue
for discovery); see also infra Appendix II: Court Order Granting Limited Discovery for Response
to Summary Judgment Motion.
77. See, e.g., Op. at 4 n.2, In re BLI Farms, No. 05-2292 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2006), http://
www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/06a0376p-06.pdf.
78. See authorities collected in Appendix III: Sample Motion to Preserve Trial Date.
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However, if this first avenue is not possible, there are alternatives. If a
solid entity liability case has been developed (e.g., based on improper poli-
cies or failure to train), plaintiff’s counsel can dismiss the individual de-
fendants and simply proceed against the entity. This strategy denies to the
defense any basis for an appeal but eliminates potential defendants for the
jury to hold accountable. Even though the case may already be on appeal,
the circuit court can remand the case for defendants to be dismissed if the
plaintiff secures from the district court a statement that the district court
intends to grant the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the individuals if the case
is indeed remanded as the plaintiff requested.79
A similar tactic is to dismiss defendants entitled to QI but retain
claims pending against private individual defendants who acted under
color of state law, such as prison medical service providers, as these indi-
viduals are generally not entitled to QI.80 This strategy should be utilized if
you are well positioned to focus the case on the conduct of private individ-
ual defendants.
C. Litigation Tips
This section provides the civil rights litigator with several practical
ideas for improving effective case presentations, as through the use of
video, deposition strategies, voir dire techniques, and settlement ideas.
1. The Power of Video
Use Ashcroft v. Iqbal to your advantage. Many defendants file motions
to dismiss, claiming the civil rights plaintiff fails to state a “plausible claim”
under § 1983, warranting dismissal of the suit under Iqbal. When possible,
my colleagues and I attach video evidence to the complaints we file to
anticipate and short-circuit this move.81 We cite Ashcroft v. Iqbal as our
basis82 and the Supreme Court’s ringing endorsement of video evidence in
Scott v. Harris.83 It is important to videotape all important depositions. The
results can be game changing.84 Many local rules permit videotaped depo-
79. See First Nat’l Bank of Salem, Ohio v. Hirsch, 535 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1976); Motion
for Order in Support of Remand, Kies v. City of Lima, Ohio, No. 3:07-CV-01258 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 19, 2009).
80. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
81. See infra Appendix I: Sample Complaint Introduction.
82. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
83. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); see, e.g., Jackson v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, No.
1:08-CV-00203 (S.D. Ohio) (attaching video of defendant discharging pepper ball gun at plain-
tiff to memorandum); Peabody v. Perry Township, Ohio, No. 2:10-CV-01078 (S.D. Ohio)
(attaching video of defendant tasing plaintiff at top of fence to complaint).
84. See, e.g., Lowe v. Cuyahoga Cnty./Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, No. 1:08-CV-
01339 (N.D. Ohio) (psychiatrist admitting that the failure to administer drug caused plaintiff to
experience withdrawal and caused his death); Jennings v. City of Lima, No. 3:08-CV-01868
(N.D. Ohio) (SWAT training officer explaining difference between objective and subjective
standard regarding use of force and later portraying conduct of deceased); Gray v. Village of
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sitions upon agreement of parties.85 We often record the depositions our-
selves and give the opposing counsel a copy of each deposition DVD. We
only use a professional videographer for the most important witnesses in
order to cut down on costs. The recorded depositions are valuable aids
both at trial and in mediation presentations. In our experience, we have
found that it is worth the cost. We also have a court reporter transcribe
depositions. Sometimes we even “synch” the written deposition transcript
to the video in order make the point even stronger.
2. Deposition Goals
Develop specific goals for each deposition you conduct. With a thor-
ough fact investigation prior to filing the complaint and a thorough docu-
ment production after filing, the plaintiff’s theory of the case should be
well developed before depositions begin. In cases involving jail or prison
conditions or those involving contact with law enforcement, it may be
helpful to start depositions with a “jail 101” witness to explain how a par-
ticular jail operates or a “police 101” witness to explain how a police de-
partment operates. Sometimes the defendant organization is so confusing
or its operations are so dispersed that a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is needed
to sort out where the power lies.86 When you depose the defendants, be
sure to include a portion that is essentially cross examination to capture any
admissions. This often involves getting a defendant to agree to rules that
should be followed when using force or engaging in the conduct at issue
and then applying those rules to the facts of the case at hand.
Attached is a portion of a deposition of Defendant Steve Koebel in
Gray v. Village of Middleport.87 He shot the unarmed plaintiff, James Gray,
in the face after commanding the drunk and staggering Gray to show his
hands, turn around, and get down on the ground all at once.88 When Gray
complied with one of the three commands and turned around, he was
shot.89 This deposition excerpt simply commits Koebel to the reasonable
Middleport, Ohio, No. 2:09-CV-00868 (S.D. Ohio) (police chief explaining that he “never got
around to performance evaluations”).
85. For example, the District Court of the Northern District of Ohio allows for, and even
encourages videotaped depositions. See N.D. Ohio R. 32.1, http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/
assets/Rules_and_Orders/Local_Civil_Rules/Rule321.pdf.
86. In depositions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), the defendant must
designate a person who can explain facts related to issues that are important to a case such as the
system for use of force investigations. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 30(b)(6).
87. See infra Appendix IV: Sample Deposition Questioning.
88. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Response to Motions for Summary Judgment by Defend-
ants Koebel and Village of Middleport at 1-3, Gray v. Village of Middleport, No. 2:09-CV-868
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.gbfirm.com/litigation/documents/50_48-Memoin
OpptoMSJ.pdf.
89. Id.
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rules police officers should follow when confronting a suspect one-on-
one.90
3. Voir Dire and Argument Strategies
In Meyer v. McNicholas, the plaintiff was a sex offender who was as-
saulted by several men in prison without sustaining any serious physical
injuries.91 The defendant was a retired matronly former sergeant who
failed to remove the perpetrators from the prison unit after she was told of
their threat.92 The goal of voir dire in this case was to challenge for cause
every jury panel member who could not envision awarding damages to a
prisoner and sex offender plaintiff. It is not unusual with this type of voir
dire to get eight to ten panel members struck for cause.
The closing argument in Meyer is also attached, as it was drafted with
Keenan and Ball’s principles in mind.93 The jury proceeded to return a
$40,000 verdict in favor of the plaintiff.94
4. Approaching Settlement
This Article started by describing noneconomic terms that can help
individual cases have an impact beyond the plaintiff(s) in the case. But suc-
cessful settlements like this do not just happen; they are the product of
thorough preparation. Generally, a settlement proposal is not likely to have
much impact until discovery is completed, the plaintiff’s expert report has
been filed, and the defendants have secured their expert report and filed
their motion for summary judgment. There may be cases in which an early
settlement is possible because the failure to settle will cost the defendants
large legal fees even though the plaintiff does not have substantial injuries.
In such cases, it is key to propose an early settlement.
We put together a video that tells the story of the case in a “60 Min-
utes” style, so defendants and other viewers are hit with one uncontro-
verted fact after another. There is little argument in the narration. The
visuals and story all line up to form a compelling narrative. Then we nego-
tiate fair compensation first. When agreement is reached or close on that
front, we remind the defendant of our noneconomic proposals and wrap
all of the terms together as a single package. This negotiation sequence is
important because we do not want to trade client compensation for the
reform terms.
90. See infra Appendix IV: Sample Deposition Questioning.
91. See infra Appendix V: Sample Voir Dire.
92. Id.
93. See generally Ball & Keenan, supra note 47; see also infra Appendix VI: Sample Closing
Argument.
94. Order, Meyer v. Barbara McNicholas, 2:07-CV-1253 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 12, 2007).
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D. Attorney’s Fees in Civil Rights Cases
Attorney’s fees in civil rights cases are authorized by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988.95 If the plaintiff is the prevailing party, the court can award fees
against the losing defendant. This is contrary to the traditional American
rule, whereby parties are responsible to pay their own attorneys regardless
of the outcome. However, in the interest of justice, § 1988 was established
to allow those who could not otherwise afford legal representation to pro-
tect their civil rights and to encourage attorneys to take civil rights cases
they could not otherwise afford to take.96 Because civil rights work often
involves vulnerable clients who cannot afford the costs of representation,
this helps fuel the work of civil rights attorneys. And since fees are only
awarded when the client prevails, even the most diligent attorney will lose
cases and will get no fees. This is a part of the life of a civil rights attorney,
and for this reason, it is important to know what to expect from this
process.
1. Prevailing Party
To be entitled to attorney’s fees, the plaintiff must “prevail.”97 A
plaintiff prevails when he succeeds on “any significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”98
This means that the plaintiff need not prevail on every issue. However,
when the plaintiff does not prevail on a claim unrelated to the successful
claim, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim are excluded from the
calculation of fees.99 But where the claims are related, a plaintiff who has
won “substantial” relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced because
the court did not adopt each claim raised.100 A mathematical comparison
of the successful issues versus the issues raised was rejected in Hensley v.
Eckerhart, instead courts have been granted discretion to make an “equita-
ble judgment.”101
Importantly, a plaintiff prevailing through settlement rather than liti-
gation does not bar a fee award.102 In Johnson v. Jago, the Sixth Circuit
established the test for determining whether a plaintiff is a prevailing plain-
95. The Civil Rights Attorney Fee Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (providing for fee
award to prevailing party in actions under §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, Title VI, IX, XX).
96. Melissa Ibrahim, Note, Bills, Bills, Bills: The Effect of a Rejected Settlement on Attorney’s
Fees Under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 36 Cardozo L.R. 1987, 1992
(1988). The Fair Housing Act also provides for attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613(c)(2).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012).
98. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 441 (1983).
99. Id. at 424.
100. Id. at 436.
101. Id. at 436 n.11, 437.
102. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 123 (1980).
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tiff when the case is settled.103 The court said that to qualify as a “prevail-
ing party” a plaintiff must show two things.104 First, the plaintiff “must
demonstrate that his or her lawsuit was causally related to securing the
relief obtained.”105 Second, the plaintiff “must establish some minimum
basis in law for the relief secured.”106
If the lawsuit did not end in a judgment on the merits or in a settle-
ment, but rather served as a “catalyst” for voluntary change on the part of
the defendant, attorney’s fees are usually not available.107 However, if the
plaintiff personally receives a substantial benefit from the voluntary action,
such as the changing of an unconstitutional program or policy directly
impacting the plaintiff, fees may still be awarded.108
With respect to obtaining fee awards, it is also important for plaintiff’s
counsel to sue the proper defendants. While the Eleventh Amendment
does not prevent attorney’s fees from being awarded against the state,109
suits brought only against government officials in their personal capacities
cannot lead to fee awards against the governmental entities.110 Liability on
the merits and responsibility for the fee award go hand in hand.
2. Determining the Award Amount
The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an
award and must provide the court with records of the time billed, with
sufficient detail to enable the court to identify distinct claims.111
The fee must then be calculated, starting with a determination of the
reasonable hours expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.112 If the
plaintiff is successful with regard to some claims but not others, the hours
spent on the unsuccessful claims may not be compensated if they were
unrelated to the successful claims or were not reasonably expended in pur-
suit of the ultimate result achieved.113 Moreover, exceptional success sup-
ports an enhanced reward.114
103. Johnson v. Jago, 691 F.2d 283, 286 (6th Cir. 1982).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 598 (2001).
108. Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 699 F.2d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 1983).
109. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 679 (1978).
110. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 160 (1985).
111. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1982); see also Imwalle v. Reliance Med.
Products, 515 F.3d 531, 553 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing how detailed attorney hours must be).
112. Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 551. This is sometimes referred to as the “lodestar.” See North-
cross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis Sch., 611 F.2d 624, 642 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
911 (1980).
113. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.
114. Id. at 435; see also Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010).
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The fee award may also compensate the hours expended by parale-
gals, law clerks, and recent law school graduates, at prevailing rates.115
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), attorney’s fees in
prisoner cases are awarded at 150 percent of the amount authorized by the
Judicial Counsel.116 Effective January 1, 2015, the authorized rate is $127.
This makes the PLRA rate $127 x 1.5 = $190.50.117
3. Multipliers
The amount of the lodestar—the reasonable hours expended multi-
plied by the reasonable hourly rate—can be increased by a multiplier for
superior performance, but only in extraordinary circumstances.118 In
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, a multiplier of 1.75 was applied to the calcula-
tion of attorney’s fees.119 My firm brought this case on behalf of a trans-
gender employee facing employment discrimination.120 At the time we
brought the case, the Sixth Circuit did not recognize gender identity as a
protected class under Title VII. Our success in such a challenging situa-
tion, considering the novelty and difficulty of the question, the immense
skill required to conduct the case properly, the extraordinary result
achieved, and the highly controversial nature of case, made the multiplier
appropriate.121
4. Prevailing Defendant
Unlike a prevailing plaintiff, a prevailing defendant will not usually be
entitled to attorney’s fees. Fee awards to plaintiffs effectuate congressional
policy and punish violators of federal law. These considerations are absent
when defendants prevail, so fees will only be awarded to defendants when
the action brought was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless or when the
plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.122
5. When to File for Fee Awards
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specify that a motion for attor-
ney’s fees be filed no later than fourteen days after the entry of judg-
ment.123 However, if there is a local district court rule, that rule will apply
115. Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 275 (1989).
116. Hadix v. Johnson, 398 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 2005).
117. Chapter 2, 230: Compensation and Expenses of Appointed Counsel, U.S. COURTS, http:/
/www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciary-policies/cja-guidelines/chapter-2-ss-230-compen-
sation-and-expenses.
118. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 546.
119. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 746.
122. Christiansburg Garment v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
123. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B), Timing and Contents of the Motion (Dec. 1, 2009)
(“Unless a statute or a court order provides otherwise, the motion must: (i) be filed no later than
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instead.124 For example, the Southern District of Ohio gives forty-five
days to file a motion for attorney’s fees.125
6. Costs
Costs are also available under § 1988.126 This includes the out-of-
pocket expenses normally charged to fee-paying clients, such as copying,
paralegal hours, travel, and telephone calls.127 The statutory text was
amended to allow courts to include expert witness fees, stating that in
“awarding an attorney’s fee . . . the court, in its discretion, may include
expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.”128
7. Rule 68
If a defendant makes a reasonable settlement offer under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 68, and the plaintiff rejects it, the plaintiff takes the risk
of paying the costs that the defendant incurs in continuing with the litiga-
tion.129 If the plaintiff ultimately receives a judgment less favorable than
the unaccepted offer, the plaintiff becomes responsible for those additional
costs.130 If the judgment is better than the offer, however, the plaintiff is
not responsible for those costs.131 This is designed to encourage plaintiffs
to take reasonable settlement offers.
The rule includes “costs,” so when attorney’s fees are considered a
part of costs (as they are under most statutes providing for attorney’s fees),
then attorney’s fees are included as costs under Rule 68.132 If a plaintiff
rejects a reasonable settlement offer, receives a less favorable judgment, and
pays for the post-offer costs of the defendant, that plaintiff cannot receive
14 days after the entry of judgment; (ii) specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other
grounds entitling the movant to the award; (iii) state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate
of it; and (iv) disclose, if the court so orders, the terms of any agreement about fees for the
services for which the claim is made.”).
124. White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 455 U.S. 445, 454 (1982).
125. S.D. Ohio Local Rule 54.2 (2014) (“Motions for attorney fees under Fed. R. Civ. P.
54 must be filed not later than forty-five days after the entry of judgment.”).
126. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. Memphis City Sch., 611 F.2d 624, 633 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2012).
127. Northcross, 611 F.2d at at 639.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c).
129. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d).
130. Id. (“Paying Costs After an Unaccepted Offer. If the judgment that the offeree finally
obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred
after the offer was made.”).
131. Id.
132. Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 1135 (6th Cir. 1994) (Rule 68 does not apply to
attorney fees in FLSA case where statutory fees are in addition to costs instead of “as costs.”).
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post-offer attorney’s fees from the defendant.133 The plaintiff remains eli-
gible to receive attorney’s fees incurred prior to the offer.134
This rule is inapplicable when the plaintiff loses, as it assumes that a
judgment is made in favor of the plaintiff.135
8. Appeal
There are three issues to consider with regard to appeals. The first is
the impact of an unresolved question of attorney’s fees on the ability to
appeal. The second is how to review the award of attorney’s fees on ap-
peal. The third concerns frivolous appeals. The first question was addressed
in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson and Co., in which the Supreme Court im-
plemented the uniform rule that an unresolved issue concerning attorney’s
fees for the litigation in question will not prevent judgment on the merits
from being final for the purposes of appeal.136
When an award of attorney’s fees is appealed, the general rule is that
the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion.137 In the Sixth Circuit,
there is also a three-tier standard of review for determining the reasonable-
ness of the hours billed. In Wooldridge v. Marlene Industries Corp., the court
stated that the “clearly erroneous” standard applies to the review of a dis-
trict court’s determination that a prevailing plaintiff’s attorney has or has
not worked the billed hours.138 When reviewing legal questions concern-
ing the relationship of hours billed to the issues on which the plaintiff
prevailed, the court of appeals should determine whether the district court
erred.139 When looking at whether the party used poor judgment in bill-
ing the hours spent on the case, the court should look to see whether the
district court “misapplied the reasonable practices of the profession.”140
Finally, a court may award double costs and attorney’s fees under
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for frivolous
appeals.141
9. Miscellaneous
A couple of final notes on attorney’s fees are useful at this point.
Firstly, the standards used are considered generally applicable in all cases
where Congress has authorized attorney’s fees. This means that precedent
133. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
134. Id.
135. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 350-52 (1981).
136. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202-03 (1988).
137. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 738 (1986); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900
(1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
138. Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1175 (6th Cir. 1990).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Simmons v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 1995).
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from a § 1983 case where attorney’s fees were awarded under § 1988 will
be equally applicable to a Title VII case for the purpose of attorney’s
fees.142 Secondly, the time spent collecting a judgment obtained against
the defendant is also subject to the attorney’s fee provisions, and fees may
be awarded for that time.143
E. Cases Appropriate for Injunctive Relief
My firm is very active in lawsuits that seek injunctive relief, such as
litigation challenging racial profiling and excessive force,144 unconstitu-
tional prison conditions,145 abortion restrictions,146 and marriage restric-
tions.147 We just completed an eight-year effort to reform the state juvenile
prison system in Ohio with excellent results.148 Whenever there is a basis
to seek injunctive relief, doing so is more effective and enforceable than
seeking noneconomic terms in private settlement agreements. Injunctions
can be enforced with contempt motions, which is often necessary when
government officials lose their will to cooperate.149 But if an injunction is
not feasible, the tools discussed in this Article for developing meaningful
noneconomic terms are available.
CONCLUSION
Individual actions, such as the ones discussed in this Article, provide
an important way to push defendants toward reform and give clients an
additional legacy for their loved ones. I have pursued noneconomic relief
for most of my thirty-nine years as a litigator. Very early on, I realized that
if we limit our relief to money, no wisdom or real change is likely to come
about. Indeed, we enable the abuses, instead of doing something to stop
them, as a monetary award may simply be viewed as the cost of doing
business. As a result of pursuing a case strategy mindful of reform opportu-
nity, my colleagues and I have accomplished some very real changes,
142. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1982).
143. Balark v. Curtin, 655 F.2d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 1981).
144. See, e.g., Tyehimba v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-99-317 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Matje
v. Leis, 571 F.Supp. 918 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
145. See, e.g., McCullum v. Butler Cnty., No. 1:08-CV-00387-HJW (S.D. Ohio 2008);
Aldini v. Johnson, No. 3:07-CV-00183-TMR (S.D. Ohio 2007); Tolar v. Richland Cnty., No.
1:14-CV-00517 (N.D. Ohio 2014).
146. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio v. Hodges, No. 1:15-CV-568, (S.D. Ohio
2015) (currently pending before the Southern District of Ohio District Court); Planned
Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Strickland, 531 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2008); Women’s Med.
Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 2008 WL 545015 (S.D. Ohio 2008); Cincinnati Women’s Servs. v. Taft,
468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006).
147. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
148. J.P. v. Taft, No. 2:04-CV-692 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
149. See infra Appendix VII: Sample Motion to Enforce a Consent Decree.
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developed closer relationships with our clients, earned a reputation for
transformative advocacy among defense counsel, and enjoyed a deeper
sense of satisfaction with our work.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX I: SAMPLE COMPLAINT INTRODUCTION150
This civil rights action challenges the excessive force used against
Michael Kacmarik by Defendant Mitchell as well as the failure of nearby
prison employees who failed to protect Mr. Kacmarik from Defendant
Mitchell’s cruel punishment of Mr. Kacmarik. Mr. Kacmarik is disabled
and while he was incarcerated at Mansfield Correctional Institution he
used a wheelchair. Even though he knew Mr. Kacmarik was disabled,
Correction Officer Mitchell ordered Mr. Kacmarik to stand up and walk
down the hallway into a holding cell. At the time, Mr. Kacmarik’s legs
were shackled together, he was handcuffed, and his handcuffs were secured
to a belly chain around his waist. When Mr. Kacmarik explained he could
not walk Officer Mitchell jerked him out of the chair and threw him down
to the ground. Defendant Mitchell then dragged him down the hallway by
his belly chain and dropped him into a cell. A supervisor and three Mans-
field staff members knew Mr. Kacmarik was unable to walk, yet they
watched Defendant Mitchell abuse Mr. Kacmarik and failed to intervene
to protect him from harm. Defendants’ actions were captured on video, a
copy of which is incorporated in this complaint and filed along with the
complaint.151 Mr. Kacmarik brings this action to secure compensation and
other relief and in the hope that this case will help prevent other abuse of
disabled inmates at the Mansfield Correctional Institution.
150. Compl. ¶ 1, Kacmarik v. Mitchell, No. 1:15-CV-2062 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2015).
151. The video recording was provided by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitations and
Corrections in response to a public records request. Many civil complaints are now challenged as
failing to state a claim under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell-Atlantic v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007). In response to such motions plaintiffs must demonstrate that allegations are
“plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. There is no better way to demon-
strate the plausibility of a fact than a video of the events in question. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (videotape controlled over contradicting testimony); Marvin v. City of Tay-
lor, 509 F.3d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 2007) (same).
SPRING 2016] Making a Buck While Making a Difference 277
APPENDIX II: COURT ORDER GRANTING LIMITED DISCOVERY FOR
RESPONSE TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION152
This matter is before the Court on the Motion of Defendants Jason
Miller and the United States to Stay Discovery in these cases pending reso-
lution of Officer Miller’s motion to dismiss/or in the alternative for sum-
mary judgment based upon qualified immunity. (ECF #37 in Case No. 12
CV 1057 and ECF #14 in Case No. 13 CV 1522). Also before the Court
is Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery under Rule 56(d), in which Plaintiff
requests that the Court defer or deny Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment to allow Plaintiff time to take discovery. (ECF #39 in Case No.
12 CV 1057)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed both of the actions at issue following an incident in a
Wal-Mart parking lot on December 3, 2011. In that incident, Officer Ja-
son Miller, a Strongsville Police Officer and a member of the Northern
Ohio Law Enforcement Task Force (“NOLEFT”), fired ten bullets at
Plaintiff when he allegedly failed to stop his vehicle and allegedly reached
into his jacket following a drug deal. On April 30, 2011, Plaintiff brought
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Officer Miller and the City of Strongs-
ville alleging excessive force. (Case No. 12 CV 1057). As discovery was
about to begin, Plaintiff’s counsel was informed that Officer Miller was
acting as a federal task force officer when he shot Plaintiff. At that point,
the action was stayed and Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies in
order to filed a claim against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“FTCA”). Plaintiff filed an FTCA action against the United
States on July 15, 2013 (Case No. 13 CV 1522) and amended his com-
plaint in Case No. 12 CV 1057 which contains claims against the City of
Strongsville and an individual capacity Bivens claim against Officer Miller.
The cases have been consolidated for convenience of the parties and
Court.
Officer Miller filed a Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF #36) on November 15, 2013, asserting that the
shooting was justified and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. He
attaches a number of exhibits, including the police investigative report, to
his motion along with the declaration of Lori Lee Holland to authenticate
the records. These exhibits are cited throughout Officer Miller’s rendition
of the facts. While Officer Miller asserts that he is entitled to qualified
immunity based solely upon the allegations contained in the amended
complaint, the Court finds that it is only the exhibits attached to the mo-
tion which support Officer Miller’s factual recitations. As such, the Court
will treat Defendant’s motion as a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff
152. Order, McKissic v. Miller, Nos. 1:12 CV 1057 & 1:13 CV 1522 (N.D. Ohio Dec.
20, 2013).
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has flied a motion pursuant to Rule 56(d) to permit discovery before re-
sponding to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, supported some-
what belatedly, by counsel’s declaration in support of why the requested
discovery is necessary to respond to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. While cognizant that the issue of qualified immunity should be
resolved at the earliest possible point in the proceedings, it is nevertheless
necessary to gather sufficient evidence in order to permit the Court to
determine if a Constitutional violation occurred. Although Defendants
wish the Court to make this determination based upon Officer Miller’s
police report, Plaintiff’s declaration and the report of forensic expert David
Balash, support Plaintiff’s contention that there may be material questions
of fact regarding some elements of Officer Miller’s police report. Accord-
ingly, Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF #37 and #14) are DE-
NIED and Plaintiffs Motion for Discovery under Rule 56(d) (ECF #39) is
GRANTED. Plaintiff will be permitted to take the following limited dis-
covery before responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment:
• the deposition of Officer Miller;
• the deposition of eyewitnesses to the shooting;
• the deposition of the officer(s) responsible for the crime scene
investigation;
• access to unredacted contemporaneous reports by eyewitnesses;
and
• access to any forensic analysis of the shooting and supporting tests
done by law enforcement.
This discovery shall be completed by February 24, 2014. Plaintiff’s re-
sponse to the Motion for Summary Judgment shall be filed by March 24,
2014.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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APPENDIX III: SAMPLE MOTION TO PRESERVE TRIAL DATE153
I. INTRODUCTION
This court has denied summary judgment to the two individual of-
ficers in this excessive force case. Doc. 65. Defendants in many cases have
routinely taken this opportunity to file an appeal on qualified immunity
and delay the case for one to two years. But an appeal on this record will
not support appellate jurisdiction and therefore such an appeal should not
interfere with this court’s scheduling of the final pretrial and trial of the
action. As set out below, the summary judgment record in this case shows
that any appeal raising qualified immunity will be frivolous. This Court
should use its power to declare any appeal frivolous and proceed as sched-
uled to trial.
II. ARGUMENT
A. Frivolous Appeals do not Divest the Court of Jurisdiction
If this court certifies an interlocutory appeal as frivolous it is free to
proceed with the trial while the appeal is pending. The Supreme Court
approved of this practice in civil rights cases in Behrens v. Peltier, 516 U.S.
299, 310-311 (1996).
In the present case, for example, the District Court appropriately
certified petitioner’s [qualified] immunity appeal as “frivolous” . . . This
practice, which has been embraced by several Circuits, enables the district
court to retain jurisdiction pending summary disposition of the appeal, and
thereby minimizes disruption of the ongoing proceedings. See, e.g.,
Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (C.A.9 1992); Yates v. Cleveland, 941
F.2d 444, 448-449 (C.A.6 1991); Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 576-577
(C.A.10 1990); Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339 (C.A.7 1989).
In Yates v. Cleveland, supra (cited by Supreme Court) the Sixth Cir-
cuit had an extended discussion of the potential for abuse in excessive force
and other civil rights cases by defendants who file qualified immunity ap-
peals that lack merit. The Court stated that, “[u]nfortunately, Forsyth ap-
peals can be employed for the sole purpose of delaying trial.” The Court
noted with approval the analysis and solution proposed by the Seventh
Circuit:
The Seventh Circuit has directly addressed this issue in Apostol
v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.1989), which examined the
jurisdictional bases of Forsyth appeals from a denial of qualified
immunity. In Apostol, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion noted that a
Forsyth appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction to conduct
a trial until qualified immunity is resolved. Id. at 1338. How-
153. Plaintiff’s Motion to Preserve Final Pretrial and Trial Dates, Kies v. City of Lima, No.
3:07-CV-01258 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2009).
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ever, delaying trial in order to allow a defendant to appeal a
denial of qualified immunity prolongs the process, often to the
disadvantage of the plaintiff:
During the appeal memories fade, attorneys’ meters tick,
judges’ schedules become chaotic (to the detriment of litigants
in other cases). Plaintiffs’ entitlements may be lost or under-
mined. Most deferments will be unnecessary. The majority of
Forsyth appeals-like the bulk of all appeals-end in affirmance.
Defendants may seek to stall because they gain from delay at
plaintiffs’ expense, an incentive yielding unjustified appeals.
Defendants may take Forsyth appeals for tactical as well as strate-
gic reasons: disappointed by the denial of a continuance, they
may help themselves to a postponement by lodging a notice of
appeal. Proceedings masquerading as Forsyth appeals but in fact
not presenting genuine claims of immunity create still further
problems. Apostol, 870 F.2d at 1338-39. In order to prevent
Forsyth appeals from becoming an “entitlement to block the
trial,” id. at 1339, Apostol makes the following suggestions
(based on an analogy with double jeopardy cases): (1) allow the
district court to certify an appeal as frivolous and begin the trial; or (2)
expedite through summary disposition appeals in which the de-
fendant has “wait[ed] too long after the denial of summary
judgment” or “use[d] claims of immunity in a manipulative
fashion[.]” Id. at 1339.
Yates v. Cleveland, 941 F.2d at 448-449 (emphasis added).
Courts continue to approve of the practice of certifying the appeal as
frivolous in order to retain jurisdiction. Davenport v. City of Columbus, GA,
2008 WL 3871729 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2008)(trial court retained jurisdic-
tion as attempted qualified immunity appeal is without merit); Rivera-
Torres v. Ortiz Velez, 341 F.3d 86, 94-96 (1st Cir. 2003)(acknowledging
that certifying appeal as frivolous is sound practice for retaining trial juris-
diction); Manning v. Dye, WL 21704431 (N.D. Ill July 22, 2003)(retaining
jurisdiction and holding immunity appeal to be “baseless”); Ruffino v.
Sheahan, 61 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding appeal to be “frivo-
lous”) aff’d, 218 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2000); Gilbaugh v. Balzer, 2001 WL
34041845 (D. Ore. Sept. 6, 2001) (same); Langley v. Adams County, Colo,
987 F.2d 1473, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (describing practice for certifying
immunity appeals as frivolous and allowing trial courts to retain jurisdic-
tion); Andre v. Castor, 963 F.Supp. 1169 (N.D. Fla. 1997) (same).
It is clear, therefore, that the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit and
other Courts across the country have approved of the practice of declaring
a qualified immunity appeal to be frivolous and thereby retaining jurisdic-
tion in the trial court.
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B. What is a Frivolous Qualified Immunity Appeal?
A qualified immunity appeal based on contested facts is frivolous and
does not provide a basis for an interlocutory appeal.
The Supreme Court has created a two-tiered test to determine
whether or not defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). The first question a court
must answer is whether the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct vio-
lated a constitutional right. If that question is answered affirmatively, the
court must then ask whether the right alleged was clearly established when
the violation was alleged to have occurred. Id. at 201. The order for an-
swering those questions was recently relaxed by the Court but the essential
questions related to qualified immunity remain unchanged. Pearson v. Cal-
lahan, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009). While the existence of qualified immunity is
typically a question of law, the task simply cannot be done so long as the
facts are in dispute. In such instances immunity decisions must necessarily
wait on the fact finder determinations. Brandenburg v. Cureton, 882 F.2d
211, 216 (6th Cir. 1989). When a Court denies qualified immunity be-
cause facts material to the defense are in dispute, a qualified immunity
appeal does not lie. An interlocutory appeal may be taken from the district
court’s denial of qualified immunity only when the immunity issue can be
decided on appeal as a matter of law. When denial of summary judgment
is based upon a determination that there are genuine issues of material
facts, an appeal cannot be taken. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S.Ct.
2151(1995).
Johnson is very instructive to this Court. The plaintiff in that case
alleged that he was beaten by the defendant law enforcement officers. The
appellants claimed that there were insufficient facts to hold them as de-
fendants regarding the alleged beating. The district court held that there
were contested material facts and denied summary judgment. The Seventh
Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction because contested facts cannot sup-
port a qualified immunity appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed. In a
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court noted that interlocutory appeals
can cause harm, can make it more difficult for trial judges to do their job,
and can delay proceedings and add costs. Id. The immunity appeals also
create additional appellate court work especially when the trial, if it had
just proceeded, would have eliminated the need for the appeal. Id. In John-
son, the Court held the record on summary judgment raised a genuine
issue of fact whether the defendants beat or failed to protect the plaintiff
and therefore no qualified immunity appeal was allowed. Id. at 2156.
The Supreme Court reiterated its holding a year later and narrowed
qualified immunity jurisdiction to disputes “concerning an abstract issue of
law relating to qualified immunity . . . typically, the issue whether the
federal right allegedly infringed was clearly established.” Behrens v. Pelletier,
516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, 842 (1996). In other words, if what is at
issue in the appeal is nothing more than “whether the evidence could sup-
282 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 21:251
port a finding that particular conduct occurred,” there is no appellate ju-
risdiction because that question is inseparable from the merits of the
plaintiff’s claim. Id.
The Sixth Circuit has followed the Supreme Court’s ruling and made
it clear that there is no appellate jurisdiction over a qualified immunity
appeal when the facts are in dispute. See Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561,
562 (6th Cir. 1998):
We hold that in order for such an interlocutory appeal based on qual-
ified immunity to lie, the defendant must be prepared to overlook any
factual dispute and to concede an interpretation of the facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff’s case. Here the defendants have not so con-
ceded the facts. The appeal should not have been filed because there is
clearly a factual dispute at the heart of the qualified immunity issue, and so
we dismiss this interlocutory appeal.
Recently the Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction in a police
misconduct case where the qualified immunity appeal was grounded in a
factual dispute. In Carter v. City of Wyoming, 2008 WL 4425986 (6th Cir.
Oct. 1, 2008) the plaintiff alleged that the defendants used excessive force
when arresting her for disorderly conduct following an altercation at a
jewelry store. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied
because the district court found that genuine questions of material fact
existed as to whether or not a constitutional violation occurred, which
precluded a finding of qualified immunity. The Defendants argued that
videotape evidence directly contradicted the plaintiff’s version of the facts,
and that, consequently, there was no issue of genuine fact. The Sixth Cir-
cuit rejected this argument, and found that, despite this videotape, ques-
tions of genuine fact existed, particularly with respect to conduct that
allegedly occurred outside of the store and away from the video camera. As
such, the Sixth Circuit found that the evidence presented by the officer “at
most presented evidence that cast doubt on [Plaintiff’s] version of the
facts. That is hardly enough for us to conclude that ‘no reasonable jury’
could find that [the plaintiff] was injured and it does not overcome John-
son’s prohibition on appellate second guessing of the appropriate infer-
ences to draw from the record.” Id. at *3.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit rejected an appeal of a trial court decision
denying summary judgment on the grounds that genuine issues of material
fact exist in Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F. 2d 725 (6th Cir. 2006). In
this case, several defendants appealed the district court’s denial of summary
judgment. The court repeatedly reiterated that “the district court’s deter-
mination that there exists a triable issue of fact cannot be appealed on an
interlocutory basis, even when that finding arises in the context of an as-
sertion of qualified immunity.” Id. at 742.
A qualified immunity appeal was also dismissed in Whittie v. Doyle,
228 Fed.Appx. 512 (6th Cir. 2007). The district court held that the plain-
tiff had presented sufficient evidence to prove his case and that the evi-
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dence creates a material question of fact as to whether or not a
constitutional violation took place. The defendants then appealed. Plaintiff
filed a motion to dismiss, citing Johnson. The appellate court granted the
plaintiff’s motion, finding that determinations of evidentiary sufficiency
are not immediately appealable merely because they happen to arise in a
qualified immunity case, and that, in this case the appellants merely raise
factual arguments that take exception to the trial court’s finding that the
plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to resist summary judgment on the
issue of qualified immunity. Id. at 515.
The decisions set out above follow a steady stream of consistent Sixth
Circuit rulings on this issue. See Strutz v. Hall, 2005 WL 451786, at *2
(6th Cir. 2005) (appeal dismissed) (“We conclude that the resolution of
this case hinges on a question of fact, not a question of law or a mixed
question of law and fact”); Hoard v. Sizemore, 198 F.3d 205 (6th Cir. 1999)
(court lacked jurisdiction on qualified immunity appeal because the district
court determined that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to what
motivated their constructive discharge); Ellis v. Washington County and
Johnson City, Tenn., 198 F.3d 225 (6th Cir. 1999) (appeal dismissed be-
cause there was a factual dispute (established by hearsay) whether defen-
dant’s actions were deliberate indifference); Little v. Wylie, No. 99-5545,
2000 WL 178406, (unreported) (6th Cir. 2000) appeal dismissed).
Thus, a qualified immunity appeal grounded in a fact dispute is frivo-
lous or without merit. Such an appeal does not divest the district court of
jurisdiction or vest jurisdiction in the appellate court. Such an appeal
should not cause a trial to be delayed.
C. Is a Potential Appeal in this case Frivolous?
Yes. The issue should be addressed based upon the summary judg-
ment record. That record is now closed. As set out in that briefing, de-
fendants do not concede the direct evidence and the inferences most
favorable to Plaintiff Kies. This Court found numerous instances where
material facts are in dispute. Doc. 65. Moreover, as this Court correctly
determined, the standard for the determination of those facts is clearly
established and there is no unsettled area of law that would make the con-
duct alleged by the plaintiff and supported by the record in this case pro-
tected under the constitution. Id.
This case presents an excellent opportunity to give guidance on a
typical problem that arises throughout this district. Qualified immunity
appeals at this late stage are almost by definition designed solely for delay.
The burden of exposing the public servant to litigation has been almost
completely borne by the defendants except for the trial itself. The purpose
of the court-made doctrine (to relieve public servants of the burdens of
meritless cases) will not be served by an appeal in this clearly jury-worthy
case. Moreover, delaying the trial and waiting for plaintiff to file a motion
to dismiss the appeal in the Sixth Circuit will not achieve the goal of this
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motion since Plaintiff will lose his spot on this court’s trial docket and wait
in line for months as the Sixth Circuit grinds through its congested docket.
Finally, it is appropriate to file this motion now, even before a quali-
fied immunity appeal is filed, in order to provide the Court the benefit of
this analysis before it automatically assumes that a notice of appeal will
divest it of jurisdiction. As set out above, this Court does not lose jurisdic-
tion when a qualified immunity appeal is filed from a record such as this.
The guidance of the Sixth Circuit has been provided on numerous occa-
sions and it is certainly appropriate to rely on that guidance and preserve
the final pretrial and trial dates in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court proceed to trial as sched-
uled regardless of any potential qualified immunity appeal since any such
appeal will necessarily be grounded in contested material facts.
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APPENDIX IV: SAMPLE DEPOSITION QUESTIONING154
Q All right. We’ve talked about your trying to determine what a
reasonable officer would do before you use force, your assessment of the
suspect, the environment, and alternatives to use of force. Do you try to do
that every time?
A Yes.
Q Before you use force?
A Yes.
Q And you try to do that even though you have to do this quickly,
and these are split-second assessments?
A Yes.
Q And you do that because that is what you’d expect a reasonable
officer to do, right?
A Yes.
Q So would you agree, everything else being equal, that an officer
should not needlessly take actions that would endanger the public?
A Right.
Q And would you agree, as a general matter and everything else
being equal, that an officer should not needlessly take actions that would
endanger the suspect?
A Yes.
Q And would you agree, as a general matter, that if an officer has
two choices and one—and everything else is equal—and one choice is
safer for the public than another, you’d take the safer course, right?
A Yes.
Q And similarly, if everything else is equal, and an officer has two
choices, and one is safer for the suspect than the other, you take that
course, right?
A Yes.
154. Koebel Dep. 35:3-36:12, Apr. 6, 2010, Gray v. Village of Middleport, Ohio, No.
2:09-CV-868 (S.D. Ohio), Thomas v. Village of Middleport, Ohio, No. 2:10-CV-139 (S.D.
Ohio).
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APPENDIX V: SAMPLE VOIR DIRE155
Members of the panel, in this case a former convict is suing a former
sergeant for failing to protect him. Mr. Meyer says he warned the sergeant
about inmates who were threatening him, the sergeant said those inmates
would be removed from the unit, the sergeant did not remove those in-
mates and when Mr. Meyer came back he was attacked.
Anyone have a problem . . . with the idea that a former convict can
even do this - come into court and make such accusations against his
jailers?
. . .
So when the judge tells you that John Meyer has a right to be in this
court and a right not to be beaten, will you follow the law and serve on
this case with an open mind?
. . .
John Meyer is a sex offender – his crime is unlawful sexual conduct
with a minor - he was 19 and had sex with a 14 year old – he has a son
from that relationship.
How many of you are troubled by Mr. Meyer’s criminal record?
. . .
Will that natural feeling of disgust or anger make it hard for you to
accept that John Meyer has a right to use the courts to make these claims
against an officer that they violated his constitutional rights?
. . .
You will learn that Sgt McNichols served as a correction officer for
13 years – no discipline – retired a few months after this incident – and
now she has to come back and face this lawsuit claiming that she failed to
protect an inmate.
Do any of you feel sympathy for her [will that feeling of sympathy
make it a lot harder to be fair to John Meyer?]
. . .
Do you think Sgt McNichols should get a pass because she must have
done her job OK for most of the inmates she supervised?
. . .
This is not just a swearing match between a former convict and a
correction sergeant. The judge will instruct you that the Eighth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution imposes on correction officers this
obligation to protect inmates from violence at the hands of other
inmates . . . .
If you hear all of the evidence and law in this case and decide based
on the evidence and law that the convict should win and that Sgt Mc-
Nichols did in fact fail to protect him from attack- will you be OPEN TO
AWARDING MONEY DAMAGES to the prisoner as compensation for his
injuries.
155. Ex. 8 Voir Dire, 7-12, Meyer v. McNicholas, 2:07-CV-1253 (S.D. Ohio).
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. . .
Anyone here feel they would reduce a fair award because they don’t
want a sex offender receiving that much money?
. . .
The judge will also instruct you that if the Plaintiff wins you should
also consider the physical pain and the emotional and mental harm to the
plaintiff.
Is awarding [money] for emotional pain and suffering too much for
anyone?
. . .
Is there anyone here who thinks that she/he cannot award punitive
damages to an inmate?
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APPENDIX VI: SAMPLE CLOSING ARGUMENT156
Members of the Jury, on behalf of my partner, Jennifer Branch and
our client John Meyer, I want to thank you for your patience with the
delays and for your careful attention to the evidence in this case.
Let’s look first at the big picture:
We live in a society full of institutions. Our children are in
schools and juvenile facilities. Our mentally ill citizens are in
locked hospital wards. Our elderly are in retirement homes and
nursing homes. And many other citizens are in jails and prisons.
We love our children that we send to school. We love our par-
ents that reside in retirement homes. We love our brothers,
cousins and friends who screw up and do time in jails and pris-
ons. We give up control when our loved ones go to these
places. We expect that our loved ones will be safe. We must
trust that the staff will hold them safely.
In this case inmate John Meyer put his trust in prison staff member
Sgt. McNichols. He warned Sgt McNichols that he was in danger from
other inmates. Sgt McNichols knew this was serious but left John housed
in the same block with the threatening inmates anyway. They attacked him
just as he feared. John says he is sure he warned Sgt McNichols. She says
variously that, (1) he did not warn her and (2) she does not know if he
warned her. When asked at one point about whether John warned her, Sgt
McNichols said, “I’m not saying if he did or did not.”
Within hours of the attack Lt. York’s incident report put the prison
on notice of John’s claim that he had warned Sgt McNichols, but no one
investigated. No one from the prison has ever interviewed Sgt McNichols
about John’s warning. With no action by the prison John turned to this
court. And turned to you, the jury, the members of the community. John
wants fair compensation but through the very process of bringing this case
and seeking your help he wants to do his part to make sure this does not
happen again in any institution in this state whether it be a school, hospi-
tal, elderly center or lock-up. Staff must protect our loved ones.
. . .
Think of it this way. Sgt McNichols is like a person operating a car.
Most of the time she stops at red lights. She knows red lights are critical for
safety. She knows that if she is looking at a red light oncoming cars have a
green and they will be proceeding through the intersection. One day she is
rushed and decides to run the red light and boom the foreseeable crash
happens. That is reckless. And as we have just seen John’s warning was the
red light in this case. Sgt McNichols was reckless when she ignored it and
John was attacked.
156. Ex. 9, at 1, 7, Closing Argument, Meyer v. McNicholas (Aug. 19, 2009).
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APPENDIX VII: SAMPLE MOTION TO ENFORCE A CONSENT DECREE157
II. THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES SHOULD BE
HELD IN CONTEMPT OF THE CONSENT DECREE.
ODYS HAS FAILED TO TAKE ALL REASONABLE STEPS WITHIN ITS
POWER TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSENT DECREE AND IS THEREFORE
IN CONTEMPT.
It is well established that federal courts may enforce their orders
through the power of civil contempt. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
690 (1978); Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 1989). In this
case ODYS has not complied with the consent decree of March 6, 2007; it
has not adhered to this Court’s clear mandate and order.
The applicable civil contempt standard was detailed by the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1991). “The petitioner
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated
the court’s prior order.” Id. at 707 (citing NLRB v. Cincinnati Broze, Inc.,
829 F.2d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 1987)). In Glover, the court had previously
ordered the defendants to comply with various requirements in an effort to
create “educational and vocational opportunities for female prison inmates
comparable to those offered to male inmates,” including a requirement to
provide access to the courts. Id. at 705, 701. The court order at issue, as in
the present case, was a negotiated settlement. Id. at 710. The defendants
argued that “they [had] done all they [could] to comply with the district
court’s . . . orders and, therefore, should not be held in contempt.” Id. at
708. The Glover court rejected this argument, emphasizing that “the test is
not whether defendants made a good faith effort at compliance but
whether the defendants took all reasonable steps within their power to
comply with the court’s order.” Id. at 708 (citing Peppers v. Barry, 873
F.2d 967, 969 (6th Cir. 1989)). Indeed, “good faith is not a defense to civil
contempt.” Id.; see also McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191
(1948) (explaining that, in a civil contempt proceeding, the defendant’s
subjective intent is not a factor to consider, because civil contempt serves a
remedial, rather than punitive purpose).
The Glover court further explained, in quoting Aspira of New York,
Inc. v. Board of Education of New York, 423 F.Supp. 647, 654 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), that the defendants were in contempt because they “fell far short of
the requisite diligence.” When faced with the court order, the defendants
were required, yet failed, “to marshal their own resources, assert their high
authority, and demand the results needed from subordinate persons and
agencies in order to effectuate the course of action required by the consent
degree.” Glover, 934 F.2d at 708; see also Bad Ass Coffee of Hawaii, Inc. v.
Bad Ass Coffee Ltd. Partnership, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1256 (D. Utah 2000)
157. Plaintiff’s Combined Motion to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not be Held in
Contempt 23-25, to Conduct Discovery, and to Enforce Provisions of the Consent Decree, J.P.
v. Taft, No. 2:04-CV-692 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2010).
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(employing the “all reasonable steps” test and noting that a party must be
“reasonably diligent and energetic in attempting to accomplish what [is] or-
dered”) (emphasis added).
Finally, the plaintiff in a civil contempt proceeding has the initial
burden to demonstrate that the defendant has not complied with the appli-
cable court order. However, once noncompliance is shown, the burden
shifts to the defendant to prove an inability to comply. As the Tenth Cir-
cuit explained in 1983:
In a civil contempt proceeding, . . .  [the plaintiff] need prove only
that the defendant has failed to comply with a valid court order. It need
not prove that the defendant is able to comply. . . . [Once the plaintiff has
met its burden,] the defendant [must produce] detailed evidence regard-
ing his ability to comply with the order.
Heinold Hog Market, Inc. v. McCoy, 700 F.2d 611, 615 (10th Cir.
1983) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 330-34 (1950); NLRB v. Trans Ocean Expert Packing, Inc., 473 F.2d
612, 616 (9th Cir. 1973). “[T]he federal rule is that one petitioning for an
adjudication of civil contempt does not have the burden of showing that
the respondent has the capacity to comply. . . . The contrary burden is on
the respondent.” Trans Ocean, 473 F.2d at 616 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court exercise its contempt
power here. The unfortunate facts enumerated in this motion are clear and
convincing; ODYS’s noncompliance with the March 6, 2007 consent de-
cree constitutes contempt of this Court. The evidence previously outlined
suggests that ODYS has not been diligent, has not been energetic, but
rather “ha[s] displayed an evidence sense of nonurgency bordering on in-
difference.” See Aspira, 423 F.Supp. at 654. ODYS has ignored its duty to
marshal resources, to assert authority, and to demand results from subordi-
nates like Sharon Hicks. In short, ODYS has not taken all reasonable steps
to comply with this Court’s order and, consequently, it should be held in
contempt. As stated above, the noncompliance is clear, and thus, the bur-
den should now shift to the Defendants to prove an inability to comply.
